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RACIAL GERRYMANDERING’S QUESTIONABLE REVIVAL
Richard L. Hasen*
INTRODUCTION
Like history, the racial gerrymandering cause of action has repeated
itself, the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce.1
In the 1990s, conservative members of the Supreme Court recognized a
new cause of action, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause, of an “unconstitutional racial gerrymander.”2 The claim
was not one, long recognized, for the intentional dilution of black votes
through the manipulative drawing of district lines. Instead, it was a shaky,
ephemeral claim based solely on appearances. Racial gerrymandering is an
“expressive harm,” aimed at preventing jurisdictions from sending an
impermissible “message” by separating voters during redistricting on the
basis of race without adequate justification. As it has become understood in
its current incarnation, when race becomes the “predominant factor” in
redistricting, it is presumptively unconstitutional. In practice, the cause of
action helped limit attempts by the U.S. Department of Justice in the 1990s
to force jurisdictions then covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to
create more majority-minority voting districts, which tended to vote
Democratic. Sometimes creating these districts helped Democrats; at other
times the concentration of reliable Democratic voters helped Republicans
by allowing the creation of more Republican districts elsewhere in a
jurisdiction. Within a decade, however, racial gerrymandering claims
seemed to wither away, as the Court used other methods to stop the
Department of Justice from reading the Act too broadly.
In 2015, the Supreme Court revived racial gerrymandering claims.3 In
Alabama Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, the four liberals on the
Court and Justice Kennedy agreed with Democrats and minority voters that

* Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, UC Irvine School of Law. Thanks to
Morgan Kousser, Nate Persily, and Nick Stephanopoulos for useful comments and suggestions.
1. Cf. KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 13 (C.P. Dutt ed., N.Y.
Int’l Publishers 1935) (1852) (“Hegel remarks somewhere that all great, world-historical facts and
personages occur, as it were, twice. He has forgotten to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as
farce.”).
2. See infra Part I.
3. See infra Part II.
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the state of Alabama engaged in an unconstitutional racial gerrymander
when it passed a legislative districting plan that over-concentrated black
voters in majority-minority districts in ostensible compliance with the
Voting Rights Act.4 There was great irony in the use of the racial
gerrymandering cause of action by minority voters who had rejected it in
the 1990s, in its acceptance by liberal justices, and in the defense of racebased redistricting by Alabama Republicans and some conservative
Supreme Court justices.5 While racial gerrymandering has for now become
a useful tool for Democrats and minority plaintiffs to fight certain
Republican gerrymanders, it is no more coherent or justified now than it
was the first time the Court recognized it in the 1990s.
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly describes the
emergence of the racial gerrymandering cause of action in the 1990s and
the critiques made of it. Part II briefly describes the circumstances leading
up to the 2015 Alabama case and the Court’s questionable revival of the
racial gerrymandering claim. Part III argues that the racial gerrymandering
claim is no more defensible when used by Democrats or minority voters
than by conservatives or Republicans. No doubt the Alabama legislature
used compliance with the Voting Rights Act as a pretext to pack more
reliable Democratic voters into a smaller number of districts to help
Republicans in the state overall. But that behavior should be policed as
either a form of impermissible racial vote dilution or as inappropriate
partisan behavior. In the end, the Supreme Court has relied upon the
incoherent racial gerrymandering claim because the Court lacks the right
tools to police certain political conduct that might be impermissibly racist,
partisan, or both. Liberal and conservative scholars have long recognized
that the Voting Rights Act’s enforcement and interpretation can have
partisan implications and motivations. The same is now true for racial
gerrymandering claims, especially given the great overlap of race and party
categories in the South.

4. 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265–69 (2015).
5. On earlier ironies, see J. Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, 1965–2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667 (2008).
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I. RACIAL GERRYMANDERING IN THE 1990S6
Legislators often draw lines for congressional, state, and local
legislative districts for self-interested reasons, but they face a number of
judicially imposed constraints.7
To begin with, since the Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote cases
in the 1960s, legislative districts cannot have great disparities in the
number of people in them because disparities give voters in smaller
populated districts greater voting power in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.8 This rule has required states to
redistrict after each census to equalize the district populations that shift
over each decade. In contrast to congressional redistricting, in which there
may be little or no deviation from strict population equality, the Court has
allowed state and local redistricting to deviate somewhat from strict
equality for legitimate reasons, such as preserving city or county
boundaries.9 For a long time, the Court seemed to allow up to a ten-percent
population deviation.10 However, the Supreme Court’s summary
affirmance in the 2004 Larios v. Cox11 case has been understood to prevent
deviations from strict population equality done for bad reasons, such as to
help one’s political party.12
States cannot intentionally dilute the votes of some voters on the basis
of race under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.13 The Court has
not yet developed a test to determine when it is impermissible to dilute the
votes of some voters on the basis of party; thus, while partisan
gerrymandering claims may still be brought to court, they inevitably fail.14
Further, under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, states must create
districts in which racial minorities have the ability to elect candidates of
6. This section draws from Richard Hasen, Argument Preview: Racial Gerrymandering, Partisan
Politics, and the Future of the Voting Rights Act, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 30, 2014, 3:02 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/argument-preview-racial-gerrymandering-partisan-politics-andthe-future-of-the-voting-rights-act/, and RICHARD L. HASEN, LEGISLATION, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, AND ELECTION LAW: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS § 11.4 (2014).
7. State law also may impose constraints, such as mandating that redistricting authorities respect
municipal boundaries or meet a certain compactness standard.
8. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565–66 (1964).
9. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 843–45 (1983). On the Court’s perhaps newfound
flexibility on strict equality in congressional districting, see Tennant v. Jefferson Cty., 133 S. Ct. 3
(2012).
10. See DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN, RICHARD L. HASEN & DANIEL P. TOKAJI, ELECTION LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 74 (5th ed. 2012).
11. 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947, 947 (2004).
12. LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra note 10, at 74.
13. City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65, 67 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, § 2, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012)).
14. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305–06 (2004).
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their choice (majority-minority districts)15 under certain conditions (the
Gingles factors), beginning with proof that the minority group is
sufficiently large and geographically compact for it to be possible to draw a
majority-minority district and that there is “racially polarized voting,”
meaning that whites and minority voters tend to vote for different
candidates.16
Until 2013, jurisdictions with a history of racial discrimination were
subject to federal oversight of their voting laws. Under section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, these covered jurisdictions could not make a change in
their redistricting maps (or other voting rules) without convincing either the
Department of Justice or a three-judge federal court in Washington, D.C.,
that its changes would not have the effect of making minority voters worse
off (the non-retrogression principle) or have an unconstitutional or
retrogressive purpose.17 In the context of redistricting, non-retrogression
had generally been understood as a requirement for covered jurisdictions
not to decrease the number of majority-minority voting districts, although
this standard was sometimes debated.18 In 2013, the Supreme Court
in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder rejected the formula under which
Alabama was subject to preclearance as constitutionally outdated.19
In addition to all of these rules, the Court in the 1990s first recognized
the racial gerrymandering cause of action as a constraint on redistricting.
This cause of action is the key concern of this Essay.
By the 1990s, the United States Department of Justice had become
aggressive in enforcing section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in the
redistricting context. Through broad readings of the scope of the Act, the
DOJ required covered jurisdictions to create as many majority-minority
districts as plausibly could be drawn given the size of a minority
population.20

15. It is probably more correct to refer to these districts these days as “ability-to-elect” districts,
since they need not be literally made up of a majority of minority voters to meet Voting Rights Act
requirements. However, the majority-minority language has been used for a long time to refer to these
districts, and I will continue to do so here.
16. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50–51, 56 (1986). For a general overview of the Gingles
factors and section 2 redistricting claims generally, see HASEN, supra note 6, at 280–88.
17. On the history and workings of section 5, see HASEN, supra note 6, at 265–73.
18. The issue became complicated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539
U.S. 461, 479–81 (2003), when the Supreme Court offered a more nuanced test for judging
retrogression—a test that Congress may have partially reversed in the 2006 Amendments to the Voting
Rights Act. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE
L.J. 174, 190 (2007). The issue was never fully tested because the Supreme Court made section 5 at
least temporarily unenforceable in the Shelby County case, discussed below.
19. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
20. For a critical examination, see ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, VOTING RIGHTS—AND WRONGS:
THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIALLY FAIR ELECTIONS ch. 5 (2009).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2601459

1 HASEN 365-385 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/7/2016 2:05 PM

Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival

369

In the 1990s round of state legislative redistricting in North Carolina,
self-interested Democrats reacted to the DOJ’s demands to create an
additional majority-minority legislative district by passing a plan that
simultaneously created the required number of such districts, protected
Democratic incumbents, and maximized the number of Democratic seats.
To accomplish these goals, the mapmakers drew some very oddly shaped
majority-minority districts, including one that tied together disparate
populations of African-American voters along the I-85 freeway corridor.21
Republicans initially challenged the legislative districting plan as a
partisan gerrymander. The claim failed, following the fate of other partisan
gerrymandering claims.22 Opponents of the redistricting plan then filed a
new claim, arguing that the redistricting was an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander.23 Importantly, the claim was not that the plan diluted the
white vote or anyone else’s vote.24 The plaintiffs were pushing a view of a
colorblind Constitution and election process,25 arguing that the plan
separated voters on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.26
In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court accepted the argument, creating a
cause of action for an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.27 Justice
O’Connor’s decision for the Court stressed the odd shape of the district and
said that the odd shape showed voters being separated on the basis of race,
in violation of the Constitution:
Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is one area in
which appearances do matter. A reapportionment plan that includes
in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are
otherwise widely separated by geographical and political
boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another
but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to
political apartheid. It reinforces the perception that members of the
same racial group—regardless of their age, education, economic
status, or the community in which they live—think alike, share the
same political interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the
polls. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as
impermissible racial stereotypes. By perpetuating such notions, a
racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra note 10, at 236–37.
See Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 399 (W.D.N.C.), aff’d, 506 U.S. 801 (1992).
See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 636 (1993).
Id. at 641.
Id. at 641–42.
See id. at 642.
See id. at 657–58.
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voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to
counteract.
The message that such districting sends to elected
representatives is equally pernicious. When a district obviously is
created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one
racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their
primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group,
rather than their constituency as a whole. This is altogether
antithetical to our system of representative democracy.28
The Court held such separation could not be sustained unless it
satisfied strict scrutiny and remanded the case for further consideration of
justification.29
Shaw was harshly criticized by some liberals and others.30 Why should
there be a cause of action for race-conscious districting without evidence of
vote dilution? Why should the shape of the district matter? Where was the
evidence that the shape of the district affected representation in the way
suggested by the majority? In any case, the districts at issue in Shaw had
many white and African-American voters in them—they were not
“apartheid” districts containing only African-Americans.31
Subsequent cases in the 1990s fleshed out the theory and workings of
the new racial gerrymandering claim.32 Justice O’Connor explained in a
later case that the interest she was protecting was against an “expressive
harm.”33 As Professors Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi explain:

28. Id. at 647–48 (citations omitted).
29. See id. at 657–58.
30. See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Gregory A. Clarick & Marcella David, Shaw v. Reno:
A Mirage of Good Intentions with Devastating Racial Consequences, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1620
(1994); Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP.
CT. REV. 245, 286–87; Daniel Hays Lowenstein, You Don’t Have to Be Liberal to Hate the Racial
Gerrymandering Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 779, 795–98 (1998).
31. Karlan, supra note 30, at 282.
However race-conscious the General Assembly had been, and it concededly had drawn the
plan with the intent to create two majority-black districts, it had not in fact segregated the
races into separate districts. Consider the racial composition of the two districts in which the
Shaw plaintiffs lived. House District 2’s population was 76.23 percent white and 21.94
percent black; House District 12’s population was 41.80 percent white and 56.63 percent
black. To say that either district even remotely resembles “political apartheid”—especially
given that House District 2, where a majority of the Shaw plaintiffs lived, was a nearly
perfect mirror of the state’s overall racial makeup—would be risible if it were not so
pernicious.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
32. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913–14 (1995).
33. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996) (“We are aware of the difficulties faced by the
States, and by the district courts, in confronting new constitutional precedents, and we also know that
the nature of the expressive harms with which we are dealing, and the complexity of the districting
process, are such that bright-line rules are not available.”).
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One can only understand Shaw, we believe, in terms of a view that
what we call expressive harms are constitutionally cognizable. An
expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes
expressed through a governmental action, rather than from the
more tangible or material consequences the action brings about. On
this view, the meaning of a governmental action is just as
important as what that action does. Public policies can violate the
Constitution not only because they bring about concrete costs, but
because the very meaning they convey demonstrates inappropriate
respect for relevant public values. On this unusual conception of
constitutional harm, when a governmental action expresses
disrespect for such values, it can violate the Constitution.34
Although Justice O’Connor continued to focus on the shape of the
district, other Court conservatives shifted the focus to motive. In Miller v.
Johnson, the Court held that race could not be the “predominant factor” in
redistricting without compelling justification.35 The Miller Court concluded
that the Georgia legislature had such an impermissible predominant motive
and remanded under the strict scrutiny standard to determine whether the
state’s apparent decision to make race predominate the redistricting process
was justified by a compelling state interest.36 The harm in Miller appeared
to be the same as in Shaw, but the proof moved from district shape to
legislative motive.
To talk of the state’s “predominant” motive in redistricting was odd,
however, because the state of Georgia, subject to preclearance, was simply
drawing the number of majority-minority districts required by the DOJ. If
anything, its predominant motive was to obtain preclearance of its plan by
proposing the number of majority-minority districts the DOJ demanded.
The placement of the districts appeared motivated not by race but by party
and incumbency considerations. Nonetheless, the Court found race to be
the predominant factor.37
The new test led lower courts to search for an impermissible legislative
motive: a difficult, if not impossible, task when examining the votes of a
multimember body.38 In 2001, the Court decided Easley v. Cromartie,39 the
34. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506–07
(1993).
35. See 515 U.S. at 916.
36. See id. at 923–27.
37. For a thorough analysis, see Lowenstein, supra note 30, at 798–801.
38. Further, jurisdictions defended their districts from racial gerrymandering claims by arguing
that they were created to avoid section 5 or section 2 Voting Rights Act liability. This argument led to
some question as to whether the Supreme Court’s conservatives would hold section 2 unconstitutional if
indeed it required the creation of these districts and the making of race a predominant factor in
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fourth time a North Carolina racial gerrymandering case reached the
Supreme Court within a decade. In Easley, Justice O’Connor and the four
more liberal members of the Court in an opinion by Justice Breyer rejected
a challenge to North Carolina’s latest redistricting plan after concluding
that party dominance, not race, was the predominant factor in drawing the
challenged district lines.40
After Easley, racial gerrymandering cases became far less frequent.
One reason may be that redistricters got smart and started drawing more
compact majority-minority districts (and hiding any evidence in emails or
other discoverable correspondence of a predominant motive in using race
in redistricting). Another key factor is likely the changed role of the DOJ.
Because of a number of cases reining in the DOJ’s powers to require the
creation of additional majority-minority districts, the DOJ was no longer
pushing jurisdictions to create more of them. Without such pressure,
jurisdictions could avoid both DOJ liability and potential problems in the
courts through the creation of too many of these districts.41 Further, the
DOJ under President George W. Bush may have had less appetite to pursue
these claims.
The politics of the claims were strange as well. Although the original
Shaw claim helped Republicans defeat a partisan gerrymander, the creation
of safe majority-minority districts challenged in Shaw litigation often
helped Republicans, especially in the South, create more and stronger
Republican districts. Redistricting sometimes depended upon an “unholy”
alliance between minority officeholders and Republicans, which sometimes
led to the creation of districts that were challenged by other conservatives
as racial gerrymanders.42
redistricting. Eventually, Justice O’Connor in a separate concurring opinion in Bush v. Vera agreed that
compliance with section 2 could be a compelling interest to justify an otherwise unconstitutional
gerrymander. But she never found that any plan she considered a racial gerrymander was compelled by
section 2. To reach this result, Justice O’Connor tweaked the holding of Thornburg v. Gingles. In
Gingles, the first prong of the threshold test was that the minority group bringing a claim is large and
compact enough to be a majority in a single-member district. Although the compactness requirement
did not have much bite before the racial gerrymandering cases, Justice O’Connor read Gingles to
require the creation of a reasonably compact majority-minority district. In other words, in a racial
gerrymandering case, it would be hard for a state to show it was compelled to draw a majority-minority
district in an odd shape to comply with section 2 if section 2 itself requires the creation of such districts
only when the minority population is reasonably compact. See LOWENSTEIN, HASEN & TOKAJI, supra
note 10, at 253–54.
39. 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
40. See id. at 243–44, 258.
41. Persily, supra note 18, at 200 n.105.
42. Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself? Social Science and Voting
Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1517, 1558 (2002) (“[T]he Republican Party has come to
recognize that the ‘safe districting’ approach of the 1990s favors its partisan interests, while the
Democratic Party has recognized the opposite. Concentrating black voters into safe majorities tends to
hurt the Democratic Party across a state as a whole because too many of the party’s most loyal voters
have been safely confined to one district.”); Ari Berman, How the GOP Is Resegregating the South,
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The most recent Supreme Court case touching on racial
gerrymandering claims until the Alabama case is League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Perry.43 This case concerned a Texas congressional
redistricting plan in the mid-2000s. Challengers raised both racial
gerrymandering and section 2 claims against parts of the plan.44 In a
portion of the majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by
the four liberal Justices, Justice Kennedy found that one of the districts,
District 23, violated section 2 of the VRA because it drew together Latinos
from different parts of the state that had little culturally or socioeconomically in common.45 The analysis appeared to merge aspects of
racial gerrymandering claims into the section 2 analysis by requiring
district residents to have more in common than simply race to avoid
liability.
II. RACIAL GERRYMANDERING’S 2015 REVIVAL IN ALABAMA46
In the 1990s, the Alabama legislature and Governor could not agree on
a redistricting plan for carving up state legislative districts, and therefore a
court drew a legislative redistricting plan. The plan contained twenty-seven
house districts that were majority-minority African-American districts and
eight senate districts that were majority-minority African-American
districts.47
In the 2000s, the Alabama legislature, controlled by Democrats, drew a
state redistricting plan that contained the same number of majority-minority
house and senate districts as the 1990s plan and preserved the percentage of
African-American voters in each of these districts.48 The districts were
allowed to deviate in population by up to ten percent.49

THE NATION (Jan. 31, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/how-gop-resegregating-south/
(“Southern Republicans formed an ‘unholy alliance’ with black Southern Democrats when it came to
redistricting. In the 1980s and ’90s, when white Democrats ruled the Statehouses, Republicans
supported new majority-minority districts for black Democrats in select urban and rural areas in
exchange for an increased GOP presence elsewhere, especially in fast-growing metropolitan suburbs.
With Democrats grouped in fewer areas, Republicans found it easier to target white Democrats for
extinction.”).
43. 548 U.S. 399 (2006).
44. The Court also rejected a partisan gerrymandering claim. See id. at 417.
45. See id. at 400–03.
46. This section draws from Hasen, supra note 6, and Richard Hasen, Opinion Analysis: A Small
Victory for Minority Voters, or a Case with “Profound” Constitutional Implications?, SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar. 25, 2015, 12:33 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/03/opinion-analysis-a-small-victory-forminority-voters-or-a-case-with-profound-constitutional-implications/.
47. Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1235–36 (M.D. Ala. 2013)
(three-judge court), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (2015).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1245.
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After the 2010 census, the Alabama legislature, now controlled by
Republicans, drew a redistricting plan that contained the same number of
majority-minority senate districts and one additional majority-minority
house district. Because of population shifts and declines, as well as the
composition of the original 2001 districts, the African-American districts
were the most underpopulated of all the districts, meaning that many voters
had to be shifted into these districts to comply with one-person, one-vote
requirements.50
The state legislative leaders in charge of redistricting set as a goal a
deviation in population of no more than two percent across districts.
Further, the leaders instructed the consultant charged with redistricting to
maintain not only the same number of majority-minority districts in the two
state houses but also the same percentage of AfricanAmericans within each district, a decision which turns out to have been a
key issue in the case before the Supreme Court. The leaders and consultant
indicated that they kept the same percentage of African-American voters in
each majority-minority district in order to comply with section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act’s non-retrogression principle.51
The result of these two commands to the redistricting consultant—a
population deviation of no more than two percent across districts and
preserving not just the number of majority-minority districts but also the
percentage of minority members in each jurisdiction—led to the shifting of
many more African-Americans into these majority-minority districts. The
upshot of these changes in the context of Alabama was to pack more of the
state’s African-Americans, the state’s most reliable Democratic voters, into
fewer districts, thereby strengthening Republican voting power in districts
throughout the rest of the state.
Black and Democratic legislators, voters, and groups brought a number
of challenges to the state redistricting plan, including a vote-dilution
challenge under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and racial and partisan
gerrymandering claims. A three-judge federal court divided two to one on
the racial gerrymandering claim.52 The two judges in the majority (both
Republican appointees) sided with Alabama, stating that the Republican
post-2010 census plan was just partisan politics, no different than what the
Democrats did in the 2000 round of redistricting:
This record offers no reason to conclude that the rules for
redistricting were turned upside down when Republicans gained
control of the Alabama Legislature. The parties have switched
50. Id. at 1294; see also id. at 1244–48 (tracing the history of the post-2010 redistricting
process).
51. Id. at 1247; see also id. at 1323–24 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
52. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1227.
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sides, but the law that governs their disputes remains the same. We
refuse to read the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments as mandating some kind of “Democratic
candidate protection program.”53
The dissenting judge (a Democratic appointee and the only AfricanAmerican judge on the panel) rejected this argument, seeing a “cruel
irony”:
Even as it was asking the Supreme Court [in the Shelby County
case] to strike down the requirement of preclearance for failure to
speak to current conditions, the State of Alabama was relying on
racial quotas with absolutely no evidence that they had anything to
do with current conditions, and seeking to justify those quotas with
the very provision it was helping to render inert.54
On the specific question whether the Alabama redistricting plan was an
unconstitutional racial gerrymander, the lower court majority held it was
not; the state’s predominant motive in redistricting was complying with the
two-percent population deviation maximum as part of the one-person, onevote principle, not dividing voters on the basis of race.55 Further, the court
held that any division of voters on the basis of race was justified by the
state’s requirement to comply with the non-retrogression principle of
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.56 The dissent disagreed, concluding that
race was the predominant factor in redistricting and that section 5 did not
require maintenance of the same percentage of minority voters in each
majority-minority district.57 Further, since Shelby County eliminated the
preclearance requirement for Alabama, compliance with section 5 could no
longer be a compelling interest to justify a racial gerrymander.58
The Supreme Court considered the two appeals in the case and agreed
to hear only the racial gerrymandering challenges;59 thus, the Court did not
decide whether the packing of African-American voters into these districts
constituted vote dilution in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
or any other claims heard in the lower court.

53. Id. at 1303.
54. Id. at 1347–48 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 1294 (majority opinion).
56. See id. at 1295–97.
57. See id. at 1347 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1345.
59. See Ala. Democratic Conference v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 2697, 2698 (2014) (noting probable
jurisdiction and limiting questions considered by the Court); Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama,
134 S. Ct. 2695 (2014) (same).
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In the Supreme Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy sided with the four
more liberal Justices, over the objections of the four more conservative
Justices, to rule against Alabama and send the case back for
reconsideration.60 The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Breyer,
held that the lower court erred in considering whether Alabama’s
legislative redistricting plan was an unconstitutional racial gerrymander as
a whole.61 The majority sent the case back to a lower court to consider the
issue on a district-by-district basis. It said that the lower court could
consider new evidence as well as other claims that the Supreme Court did
not reach, such as the “one-person, one-vote” challenge.62
But the Supreme Court majority did more than simply send the case
back for a new hearing. It very strongly suggested that at least some of the
districts were unconstitutional gerrymanders. It began by taking away two
of the state’s strongest arguments.
First, the Court held Alabama was wrong to the extent it believed that
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act required Alabama to pack more AfricanAmerican voters into districts in order to keep the same percentage of
African-Americans in each majority-minority district.63 This was a
misreading of what section 5 required, and such a reading could actually
hurt minority voters under some circumstances.64
Second, the Court held that Alabama could not point to its desire to
have more equally populated districts as its predominant factor in
redistricting.65 In other words, the majority rejected the argument that the
state could not engage in racial gerrymandering if its first order of the day
was to maintain equally populated districts. The majority took compliance
with “one-person, one-vote” out of the equation, saying this was something

60. Much of the dispute between the majority and the dissent concerned issues likely to be
unimportant in other voting cases: whether one of the sets of plaintiffs had standing and whether a key
argument of the parties was properly preserved for Supreme Court appeal. Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion even included an appendix to show where arguments were raised in the court below. See Ala.
Leg. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257 app. A (2015).
61. See id. at 1265–68 (majority opinion).
62. See id. at 1264–65, 1274. At the end of the case, the Court remanded for consideration of
these other issues in addition to the racial gerrymandering claim. See id. at 1274. (“We note that
appellants have also raised additional questions in their jurisdictional statements, relating to their oneperson, one-vote claims (Caucus) and vote dilution claims (Conference), which were also rejected by
the District Court. We do not pass upon these claims. The District Court remains free to reconsider the
claims should it find reconsideration appropriate. And the parties are free to raise them, including as
modified by the District Court, on any further appeal.”).
The rejection of the plan-as-a-whole standard seemed odd. If a state could have an unconstitutional
predominant motive as to particular districts, why could it not similarly have an unconstitutional
predominant motive as to an entire plan?
63. See id. at 1272.
64. Id. at 1272–74. Further, the Court’s reading of the “ability-to-elect” standard could improve
minority plaintiffs’ chances to succeed in their claims under section 2 of the Act.
65. See id. at 1270–71.
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that was a “background” rule to be considered before determining whether
race is a predominant factor.66
In the end, the majority all but instructed the lower court to find that at
least some of the districts were unconstitutional racial gerrymanders:
For example, once the legislature’s “equal population” objectives
are put to the side—i.e., seen as a background principle—then
there is strong, perhaps overwhelming, evidence that race did
predominate as a factor when the legislature drew the boundaries
of Senate District 26, the one district that the parties have discussed
here in depth.67
The Court then left open the question whether compliance with section
5 could be a compelling interest to justify what would be an otherwise
unconstitutional racial gerrymander and, no doubt at the urging of Justice
Kennedy, added this sentence:
Finally, we note that our discussion in this section is limited to
correcting the District Court’s misapplication of the
“predominance” test for strict scrutiny discussed in Miller. It does
not express a view on the question of whether the intentional use of
race in redistricting, even in the absence of proof that traditional
districting principles were subordinated to race, triggers strict
scrutiny.”68
With section 5 now (at least temporarily) halted by the Supreme
Court’s Shelby County decision, courts will not soon test another case in
which a state justifies its use of race as a predominant factor in redistricting
by pointing to compliance with section 5.
Justice Scalia, who wrote the principal dissent, argued mostly on the
question of standing and on whether the district-by-district issue was
preserved on appeal.69 He believed that the case was not properly litigated
and the issues were not properly preserved.70 On the merits, Justice Scalia
said little. He began with a hyperbolic statement about the effects of the
Court’s ruling, calling it a “sweeping holding that will have profound
66. See id. at 1270–73.
67. Id. at 1271.
68. Id. at 1272 (citations omitted).
69. See id. at 1274–81 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. He wrote:
This disposition is based, it seems, on the implicit premise that plaintiffs only plead legally
correct theories. That is a silly premise. We should not reward the practice of litigation by
obfuscation, especially when we are dealing with a well-established legal claim that
numerous plaintiffs have successfully brought in the past.
Id. at 1280.
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implications for the constitutional ideal of one person, one vote, for the
future of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and for the primacy of the State in
managing its own elections.”71 But he offered no follow-up to explain why
he believed the majority opinion would have such dire consequences, and it
was not evident from the majority opinion precisely what his concerns
were. It was an odd dissent, suggesting there could have been more on
substance in an earlier draft that got left out of the final version. Justice
Thomas, while joining (along with the Chief Justice and Justice Alito) in
Justice Scalia’s dissent, dissented separately as well, to express his
disagreement more broadly with Voting Rights Act jurisprudence and the
permissible consideration of race in redistricting.72
It seems likely on remand that at least some of Alabama’s districts will
be found to be racial gerrymanders. This means that some of these districts
will have to be redrawn to “unpack” some minority voters from these
districts. But Alabama could preempt the lawsuit by drawing new districts
that are less racially conscious but still constitute a partisan gerrymander
helping Republicans maintain great power over Alabama legislative
districts. The question of how far they could go may be limited by other
constraints, such as Alabama’s own substantive standards for legislative
redistricting—for instance, complying with the “whole county” provision
to keep counties together.
III. RACE, PARTY, AND JURISPRUDENTIAL INCOHERENCE
During oral argument in Alabama, Justice Scalia commented to noted
election law professor Pildes, arguing for one set of the plaintiffs:
“You realize, I assume, that you’re . . . making the argument that the
opponents of black plaintiffs used to make here.”73 Justice Breyer too noted
the “obverse and odd situation”74 of African-American plaintiffs advancing
racial gerrymandering arguments that used to be raised against the
districting plans they supported. Indeed, speaking at the Alabama
argument, Justice Sotomayor sounded the traditional liberal argument
against racial gerrymandering claims, questioning if they are based upon an
“ephemeral injury.”75 Where’s the harm?
But those concerns disappeared by the time of the Alabama opinion;
neither Justice Sotomayor nor any other liberal justice said a peep against
the use of the racial gerrymandering cause of action to reject Alabama’s
71.
72.
73.
895).
74.
75.

Id. at 1274.
See id. at 1281–88 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 135 S. Ct. 1257 (No. 13Id. at 54.
Id. at 22.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2601459

1 HASEN 365-385 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/7/2016 2:05 PM

Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival

379

redistricting plan. The former dissenters in the earlier racial
gerrymandering cases and new liberal Justices just accepted the racial
gerrymandering claim as is. It was not the first time liberals who dissented
or objected to the whole Shaw line of cases wanted to borrow it for other
purposes; Shaw dissenter Justice Stevens, for example, long argued that
partisan gerrymandering should be judged under the same “predominant
factor” standard as used in the racial gerrymandering cases, despite
dissenting in those cases.76 In Easley, Justice Breyer too accepted the Shaw
framework, but found no violation under the facts of the case.
But it is not just Democrats and those on the left who can be accused of
hypocrisy when it comes to race and voting-rights claims. Indeed,
Democrats’ use of the racial gerrymandering claim is perfectly
understandable in the context of the Republican gerrymanders in the 2010s.
The Alabama legislature was one of many Republican legislatures packing
African-Americans in districts out of ostensible compliance with the
Voting Rights Act. As Justin Levitt points out, the reason Democrats and
minority voters have been raising racial gerrymandering claims following
the latest round of redistricting is that Republican legislatures around the
country have mangled their readings of the Voting Rights Act as an excuse
to pack minority voters into fewer districts.77 For example, Alabama’s
claim that section 5 required it to maintain the same percentage of minority
voters within majority-minority jurisdictions was not only unsupported by
earlier interpretations of the Act; it had the perverse effect of hurting
minority voters. It is hard to imagine that any Alabama legislators or
staffers who understood the issue actually believed the packing was
required by section 5.
One can therefore see in the new racial gerrymandering cases both text
and subtext. The text is Republicans’ feigned adherence to the Voting
Rights Act to pass redistricting plans packing minority voters and the
Democrats’ and civil rights lawyers’ feigned acceptance of the racial
gerrymandering cause of action absent proof of vote dilution as a legitimate
response to these plans. The text is a farce.
The subtext is one of racial and party competition, in which these
feigned positions mask the real power struggle. In that struggle,
Republicans seek to maximize their political power in state legislatures and
Congress through aggressive redistricting plans that minimize the voting
strength of Democratic, especially minority, voters. Democratic and
76. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 339 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In sum, in
evaluating a challenge to a specific district, I would apply the standard set forth in the Shaw cases and
ask whether the legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control the lines drawn,
forsaking all neutral principles.”); see also JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS ch. II (2014).
77. Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty: The New Misreading of the Voting Rights Act, 43 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2487426.
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minority leaders, who have a hard time making out vote-dilution and
partisan gerrymandering claims against the plans, recast their complaints as
racial gerrymandering claims so that they have a chance to succeed in
court.
The gap between text and subtext is an artifact of the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence, which accepts certain race-based complaints and rejects
most political ones. And the problem is complicated because of the overlap
between race and party, especially in the South, where most AfricanAmerican voters vote for Democrats and many white voters vote for
Republicans.78 The overlap makes analyzing both Voting Rights Act and
racial gerrymandering claims and separating racial from partisan intent and
effect quite difficult. Is the primary purpose and effect of redistricting in
cases like Alabama a racial one or a partisan one?
On the Alabama legislature’s motive, optimists will be tempted to
assume that legislators have moved on from racism, and to see the issue as
primarily partisan, with the Republican party doing the packing of AfricanAmerican voters to hurt Democrats. Pessimists, however, have advanced a
more nefarious theory of the Alabama legislature’s aim for packing
African-Americans, in which the Republican legislature plays on private
white racism.79 By making all Democratic districts in the state majorityminority districts and leading most probably to the election of AfricanAmerican Democratic legislators, elections would send the signal that the
Democratic Party in Alabama is the “black party.” White racists then will
be drawn even more to vote only for Republicans. The harm is not
symbolic or expressive; it is an attempt to piggyback on private racial
motivations to minimize the power of the Democratic party and the
African-American voters who support it.
Plaintiffs advanced the “black party” in the Alabama case, but the
district court majority rejected it.80 The dissenter did not see the need to
address the “deep dispute” over the legislators’ motivations, but wrote that
“no black legislator” supported the redistricting plans because of their
belief that the legislative majority was trying to create a “black party.”81
78. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts
to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58 (2013).
79. See Mark Andrew, Supreme Court Colludes with Alabama Racists, STARTRIBUNE (Nov. 16,
2014,
12:33
PM),
http://www.startribune.com/supreme-court-colludes-with-alabama-racists/
282864461/; Jason Zengerle, The New Racism, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 10, 2014),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/119019/civil-rights-movement-going-reverse-alabama.
80. See Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (“The Black Caucus plaintiffs
and the Democratic Conference plaintiffs also argued that the Acts were the product of a grand
Republican strategy to make the Democratic Party the ‘black party’ and the Republican Party the ‘white
party,’ but the record does not support that theory.”).
81. Id. at 1347 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
In this case, there is a deep dispute regarding the legislative purpose behind these plans.
According to the drafters, they sought nothing more than to comply with their legal duties
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We do not know whether to believe the optimists or pessimists (and
note that the optimistic story is still pretty cynical about the nature of
legislative self-interest). The intersection of race and party makes the
search for a predominant motive impossible.
More fundamentally, the whole exercise from Shaw to Miller to Easley
to Alabama is a nonsensical one. As Dan Lowenstein ably showed in the
1990s, the Supreme Court’s search for predominant motivations in
redistricting without proof of vote dilution is quixotic.82 Legislators
engaged in redistricting face constraints, such as the Voting Rights Act and
one-person, one-vote requirements, and they then design plans conforming
to these constraints to reach their political goals. Naked self-interest may
fairly be said to predominate in most legislative redistricting exercises,
subject to legal and political constraints.83
and honor their colleagues’ wishes as far as that was possible. According to the plaintiffs,
these redistricting plans are part of a scheme to eliminate all white Democrats in the State
and thereby establish the Republican Party as the natural home for all white Alabamians,
leaving the Democratic Party comprised of only black voters and legislators. In furtherance
of that scheme, the plaintiffs claim, the drafters packed as many black people as possible
into the majority-black districts, thereby eliminating their influence anywhere else. All this,
the plaintiffs claim, was done under the pretext of seeking to comply with § 5, while in
reality the drafters were motivated by invidious racial discrimination. Apparently for this
reason, no black legislator voted in favor of these plans.
In my view, we need not resolve the question of the drafters’ ultimate purpose, nor need we
reach the plaintiffs’ other claims.
Id.
82. See Lowenstein, supra note 30.
83. See id. at 806–07.
To ask whether one factor “predominates” over others is to imply that the districting process
consists of a weighing or balancing of factors. But that is not what occurs with race in
redistricting. Under the VRA, race is not a “factor” at all, but a prior requirement in a lexical
ordering. In John Rawls’ definition of a lexical (or serial) ordering:
This is an order which requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before we
can move on to the second, the second before we consider the third, and so on. A
principle does not come into play until those previous to it are either fully met or do
not apply. A serial ordering avoids, then, having to balance principles at all; those
earlier in the ordering have an absolute weight, so to speak, with respect to later ones,
and hold without exception.
A consideration that is lexically prior is a privileged consideration. It is a necessary
precondition of what comes afterward, and aside from that, there is little that can be said
about how it is “weighted” against the rest.
....
Because the racial quotas imposed under the VRA were privileged considerations, debate
over their “predominance” is inevitably uncertain and arbitrary. Although the majority and
the dissenters in the racial gerrymandering cases debated numerous aspects of the complex
factual records, there was no serious disagreement between them over what actually
happened. In each case, the state was forced to create a minimum number of [majorityminority districts]. Subject to that constraint, the state produced its districting plan by a
normal political process of competition and negotiation. The majority on the Court and the
dissenters debated the artificial question of whether to characterize the privileged
consideration as predominant, when they all knew that the privileged consideration was
never balanced against other considerations at all.
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The Court in Alabama tried to avoid this fundamental problem with
identifying “the” predominant factor in racial gerrymandering cases when it
relegated Alabama’s compliance with the one-person, one-vote standard as
a “background” rule with which the state was obligated to comply. Thus,
compliance with the standard was taken out of factors for redistricting
which could be considered “predominant.”
But this analysis is problematic. If we eliminate all of the rules with
which a state is legally required to comply as potential predominant factors,
then what factors are left as potential predominant factors in redistricting?
There are only three: political considerations (including promoting one’s
party and protecting incumbents); racial motivations; and discretionary,
potentially desirable redistricting principles (such as creating compact or
competitive districts). Having a court choose one of the three as
predominant in a racial gerrymandering claim relies upon the wrong
conception of how redistricting occurs.
Consider, for example, Alabama’s decision to reduce population
disparities in districts from ten percent to two percent. This was a
discretionary choice. Alabama legislators were very unlikely to have a
strong feeling that it was wrong to have larger deviations from perfect
equality across districts. Rather, Alabama’s decision to move from up to
ten percent deviations in legislative districts to deviations up to two percent
was about how to achieve political goals (of minimizing Democratic or
African-American influence in the state so as to benefit Republicans)
within the one-person, one-vote constraint.
Even if it would be possible to correctly identify a legislature’s
predominant motive in redistricting, it is not worth the effort because the
cause of action for racial gerrymandering protects against no real harm.
Despite Justice O’Connor’s partially formed theory in Shaw, which was
bulked up into the expressive harm theory by Professors Pildes and Niemi,
there is no good evidence that racially conscious districts, including
majority-minority districts, actually send messages to voters about the
separation of voters by race.84 The harm of such racial gerrymandering is
less than “ephemeral”; it is non-existent. Harm arises only when racial
motivations are accompanied by actual dilutive effects on minority voters.85
This is not to say that African-American and Democratic voters in
Alabama were unharmed by the packing of minority voters into fewer
Id. (footnote omitted).
84. See DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION (1999); Stephen
Ansolabehere & Nathaniel Persily, Testing Shaw v. Reno: Do Majority-Minority Districts Cause
Expressive Harms?, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (“To put the matter succinctly, the only way a
Shaw district can communicate its message of racial stereotyping is if someone is paying attention—if a
district is drawn in the forest and no one is there to experience it, there can be no expressive harm.”).
85. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2601459

1 HASEN 365-385 (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/7/2016 2:05 PM

Racial Gerrymandering’s Questionable Revival

383

districts, even if the packing did not have a large enough vote-dilutive
effect to constitute a violation of section 2 of the Act.86 It is to say that the
harm they suffered was not an expressive one.
If in fact the Alabama legislature’s motivation for packing AfricanAmerican voters into fewer districts was to make the Alabama Democratic
Party the “black party,” then Alabama had a racially discriminatory
purpose in redistricting with a potential racially discriminatory effect,
making its plan both unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment as
well as a violation of the provisions of the Voting Rights Act aimed against
stopping intentional racial discrimination. The harm of a “black party” plan
is not the expressive one of Alabama sending a message about race; it is the
real one of the legislature intending to marginalize the power of AfricanAmerican state residents and the party they support.
But proof of intent to pursue a “black party” plan would still be
difficult (and proved difficult in the district court) for the same reason it
would be hard to prove a racial gerrymander. One way to try to deal with
proof is to borrow a tool from Easley; we could ask plaintiffs to show
through the presentation of alternative redistricting plans that the state
could have achieved its political or good-government goals without the
packing of African-Americans in fewer districts.
Another way a court could deal with minority packing when done
through manipulation of one-person, one-vote variances, as presented in
Alabama, is through extension of the Larios theory of liability for oneperson, one-vote deviations: when a state manipulates its deviations in the
one-person, one-vote rule for partisan or other illegitimate reasons, courts
should not allow it, whether the state does it to increase or decrease prior
deviations from perfect population equality. This alone would be a reason
to rule in favor of the plaintiffs in the Alabama suit and send the districting
plan back to the legislature for a new drawing of lines.
Finally, courts could invigorate the moribund partisan gerrymandering
claim in the context of cases like Alabama presenting the intermingling of
race and party issues. I have been skeptical overall of having courts police
partisan gerrymandering because of the difficulty of drawing a line

86. As the district court majority concluded:
Both the Black Caucus plaintiffs and the Democratic Conference plaintiffs also contend that
Acts 602 and 603 dilute the strength of black voters by “packing” them into majority-black
districts, that is, by “concentrati[ng] . . . blacks into districts where they constitute an
excessive majority,” but the record establishes otherwise. As the previous sections explain,
neither set of plaintiffs offered any evidence that the Legislature could have drawn another
majority-black district for either the House or the Senate as part of a statewide plan with an
overall deviation in population of 2 percent.
Ala. Legislative Black Caucus, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1284 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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between permissible and impermissible use of parties in redistricting.87
However, race and party issues are so intractable in parts of the country,
and the sense of injury in a case like Alabama is so real, that perhaps the
Court should experiment with new potential measures of partisan
gerrymandering in these cases.88
To sum it up, racial gerrymandering is an unsupportable jurisprudential
theory, whether offered by Republicans to stop potential excesses of the
Department of Justice in reading the Voting Rights Act or when offered by
Democrats to stop fake reliance by Republicans on the Voting Rights Act
in packing minority voters or otherwise manipulating district lines. When
there is a real injury affecting the actual allocation of political power, and
not an ephemeral or expressive one, the Court should work creatively to
police bad political behavior.
IV. CONCLUSION
Noting the intersection of racial and party claims in the context of the
Voting Rights Act is not new. From Morgan Kousser89 on the left to
Abigail Thernstrom90 on the right, scholars have seen how political parties
can manipulate voting rules aimed at protecting minorities for partisan
purposes. Alabama demonstrates that the same has become true of racial
gerrymandering claims.
Alabama thus gives Democratic and minority challengers a new tool,
or more accurately an old tool reworked for new purposes, making it harder
for states to use compliance with the Voting Rights Act as a pretext to
secure partisan advantage. All in all, this may help stop some egregious
gerrymanders, but there will still be plenty of ways for states to draw
district lines for partisan advantage without running afoul of the rules
barring racial gerrymanders.
Some on the left saw the Alabama decision as a rare victory for
minority plaintiffs and those who support them.91 It could even help
87. See Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan
Gerrymandering Claims after Vieth, 3 ELECTION L.J. 626 (2004). Professor Pildes advanced an early
argument to rein in both racial and partisan gerrymandering under objective standards. See Richard H.
Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505 (1997).
88. For a potentially promising measure of partisan gerrymandering, see Nicholas O.
Stephanopoulos & Eric McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. REV.
831 (2015).
89. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE (1999).
90. See THERNSTROM, supra note 20.
91. See Rick Hasen, Nick Stephanopoulos on the Alabama Redistricting Case, ELECTION LAW
BLOG (Mar. 31, 2015, 7:15 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=71412 (comments of Stephanopoulos);
Janai Nelson, Guest Blog: Janai Nelson, Preserving the Nuance of a Suspended Section 5, HAMILTON
& GRIFFIN ON RTS. (Apr. 6, 2015), http://hamilton-griffin.com/guest-blog-janai-nelson-preserving-thenuance-of-a-suspended-section-5/. Both Stephanopoulos and Nelson note that the Supreme Court’s
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strengthen the scope of section 2 by expanding the meaning of “ability to
elect” districts.92 The victory, however, is relatively small. More
importantly, racial gerrymandering claims in the hands of minority
plaintiffs is a tool not matched to the actual harm. Courts should abandon
the pretense that this is all about appearances and focus on what really
matters: the allocation of political power by self-interested actors in a
situation in which race and party are inextricably intertwined. If courts do
so, the nonsensical racial gerrymandering cause of action untethered to
proof of actual vote dilution might not have a third act.

understanding of the scope and operation of section 5 would inure to minority plaintiffs’ benefit if
Congress ever passed a new coverage formula and the Supreme Court had to once again consider legal
issues under section 5.
92. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 14–16 (2009) (requiring proof for a section 2 violation
that a reasonably compact minority group would have the “ability to elect” a candidate of its choice in a
properly drawn legislative district).
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